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An increased societal interest in providing job security for employees' is eroding the common law doctrine of employment-at-will. 2
Recent court decisions grappling with the problems of employee job
security bear witness to the growing belief that this common law
doctrine requires modification. 3 While a portion of the work force is
protected by collective bargaining agreements permitting termination
only for just cause, a significant number of employees do not have the
benefit of such contracts. 4 Recognizing the often severe consequences
of the employment-at-will doctrine, which permits employers to dismiss employees without justification, courts have acknowledged exceptions to this common law rule through the application of tort and
contract principles. 5 Recently, the New York Court of Appeals joined
See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981)
(implied-in-fact promise of just cause dismissal); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal.
App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980) (implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair
dealing found in employment contract); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579,
292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (just cause dismissal provision in policy manual enforced); Pierce v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (right to discharge at-will
restricted by clear mandate of public policy). This proposition has been the subject of a number
of legal commentaries. Articles discussing the employment-at-will doctrine include: Blades,
Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting The Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); DeGiuseppe, The Effect of The Employment-At-Will
Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URa. L.J. 1 (1981);
Comment, ProtectingAt Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate
Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job
Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974).
An early commentator on the employment-at-will doctrine stated that "the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is, primafacie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to
make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof." H. WOOD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877). In sum, the doctrine gave

the employer the right to dismiss the employee at any time. See Martin v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895) (general hiring or hiring for indefinite period is hiring atwill, terminable by either party at any time); I. LABATT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER
AND SERVANT § 159, at 516-20 (1913); S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §

1017, at 129-30 (3d ed. 1967).
3 See supra note 1.
I Comment, supra note 1, at 1816. Approximately 25% of the American workers are
unionized. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTIC L ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1982-83, at 375 (table 624) (in 1980 there were 95.9 million civilian, nonagricultural workers); id. at 409 (table 682) (22.8 million workers are members of labor organizations).
5 Courts utilizing contract principles have found the existence of an agreement not to
arbitrarily terminate from the surrounding facts and from the conduct of the parties. See Pugh v.
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those jurisdictions which have begun to restrict the application of the
employment-at-will rule with its decision in Weiner v. McGraw-Hill,
Inc.,6 in which the court denied a motion to dismiss an action for
breach of an employment contract of indefinite duration. 7
Walton Lewis Weiner had been employed by Prentice-Hall for
four years when, in 1969, he was approached by defendant McGraw-8
Hill to explore possible employment opportunities with the company.
Weiner commenced negotiations with a McGraw-Hill representative
who informed him of the company's firm policy of dismissal for "just
cause." 9 On September 15, 1969, Weiner completed and signed an
employment application form which contained a provision releasing
McGraw-Hill from any liability in investigating the applicant's personal history and previous employment.' 0 Contained within this declaration was the further stipulation that "employment [by McGrawHill] would be subject to the provisions of McGraw's 'handbook on
personnel policies and procedures.' "I' The application was subseSee's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981); Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). Contract actions for wrongful
discharge have been upheld by finding an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980);
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). Public policy
limitations on the right to discharge have been recognized under both the contract, see Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (Ct.
App. 1959) (dismissal for refusal to commit perjury); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (discharge for refusing advances of supervisor), and the tort theories,
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980)
(discharged for refusing to participate in illegal price fixing scheme); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,
74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (discharged for filing worker's compensation claim); Nees
v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (discharged for serving on jury duty); see DeGiuseppe, supra note 1; infra notes 42-74 and accompanying text; see generally Annot., 12
A.L.R. 4th 544 (1982).
6 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
7 Id. at 462, 443 N.E.2d at 443, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
Id. at 460, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
o Id.
10 Brief for Respondent McGraw-Hill, Inc. at 7-8, Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d
458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent].
1 57 N.Y.2d at 460, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194. The defendant argued that its
reference to the employee handbook on the application form should be narrowly construed as
applying only to false statements made by the employee. The application states in pertinent part:
I understand that the information given in my application for employment and any
statements made by references supplied by me will become part of my permanent
personnel record and that my employment by McGraw-Hill, Inc. will be subject to
the provisions set forth in the McGraw-Hill Employee Handbook on Personnel
Policies & Procedures and contingent upon the accuracy and acceptability of such
information and statements.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 8 (emphasis omitted). This statement, however, suggests
two interpretations. A narrow reading would construe the sentence to refer exclusively to the
company's procedures regarding the making of false statements on the application form. A more

SE TON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:396

quently signed by the interviewer and a company supervisor.' 2
Weiner accepted a position with McGraw-Hill as a senior copywriter
in October, 1969,1 3 declining a salary increase offered by PrenticeHall and forfeiting the fringe benefits he had accrued during his four
years of employment with them.14 At the time of his hiring by McGraw-Hill, Weiner was given a copy of the employee handbook "McGraw-Hill and You" ' 5 which stated, in relevant part: "[t]he company
will resort to dismissal for just and sufficient cause only, and only after
all practical steps toward rehabilitation or salvage of the employee
have been taken and failed. However, if the welfare of the company
indicates that dismissal is necessary, then that decision is arrived at
6
and is carried out forthrightly.'1
For the next eight years, Weiner worked for McGraw-Hill, receiving regular salary increases and promotions. During that time he
declined several job offers."' In addition, in his position as supervisor,
he always followed the guidelines outlined in the handbook as had
been recommended to him on several occasions by his supervisors. ' 8 In
February, 1977, however, Weiner was dismissed for what McGrawHill maintained was a "continuing failure to manage his group and
communicate with his subordinates in a professional and effective
way.""' Weiner alleged that McGraw-Hill had failed to comply with
the handbook provisions by terminating his employment without just
and sufficient cause, 20 and brought suit in the Supreme Court of New

expansive reading would incorporate all of the handbook provisions into the application form
and operate as the terms for employment. The Weiner court adopted the latter view. See infra
note 112 and accompanying text.
"2 57 N.Y.2d at 461, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194. The Brief for Respondent
indicates that the two signatures of the company representatives were affixed below the caption
"Do Not Write Below This Line." The company supervisor's signature appeared in a separate
section entitled "Record of Employment." Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 9 n.6.
'3 Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 9 n.6.
'4 57 N.Y.2d at 461, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
's Brief for Appellant Walton Lewis Weiner at 3, Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d
458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982). The Brief for Respondent states that: "The
document on which the complaint alleges that Weiner relied is the handbook 'McGraw-Hill and
You' . . . . The record is silent as to the identity of the handbook referred to in the application
form ('Employee Handbook on Personnel Policies and Procedures'), but for the purpose of this
appeal we have accepted appellant's assumption that they are the same thing." Brief for
Respondent, supra note 10, at 8 n.5 (citation omitted).
16 57 N.Y.2d at 460-61, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194 (citation omitted).
17 Id. at 461, 443 N.E.2d at 443, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 195. At the time of his termination Weiner
held the supervisory position of Director of Promotion Services. Id.
'" Id. at 465-66, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197. Weiner was told that McGraw-Hill
could be held liable for failure to comply with the procedures promulgated in the handbook. Id.
"6 Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 2.
20 57 N.Y.2d at 460, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
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York County, seeking damages in tort and contract for wrongful
1
discharge.

2

The complaint set forth three causes of action: the first in contract for breach of an employment agreement, the second in tort for
malicious failure to comply with the handbook provisions, and the
third in tort for inducement in the breach of an employment agreement. 22 McGraw-Hill moved to dismiss the complaint on the theory
that Weiner's application, with its reference to the handbook, did not
create an employment agreement giving rise to contractual rights, and
that therefore, his employment was at-will. 23 Further, McGraw-Hill
24
claimed it was not bound by its oral promise of job security.
The lower court dismissed the two tort actions, but denied the
motion to dismiss the cause of action in contract by relying exclusively
on the fact that the plaintiff had signed the application and bound
himself to the terms of the handbook. 25 The appellate division reversed, holding that the application did not constitute an employment
contract because it contained no term specifying duration. 26 In a
dissenting memorandum, Justice Kupferman agreed with the decision
of the Special Term, stating that when an employee signs an application form specifically referring to company rules, he should be able to

21 Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., No. 104 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 26, 1980), rev'd, 83 A.D.2d
810, 442 N.Y.S.2d 11 (App. Div. 1981), rev'd, 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193
(1982).
22 Id. The second and third tort actions joined Weiner's supervisor as a defendant. Id.
21 57 N.Y.2d at 461, 443 N.E.2d at 443, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
24 Id.
25 Weiner v.McGraw-Hill, Inc., No. 104, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 26, 1980), rev'd,
83 A.D.2d 810, 442 N.Y.S.2d 11 (App. Div. 1981), rev'd, 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982). Special Term succinctly rejected defendant's Statute of Frauds defense,
finding that the application form with its reference to the employee handbook constituted a
writing to satisfy the statute's requirement. Id. at 1. In addition, the lower court distinguished
the facts of the case at bar from the facts of Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418
N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1979), aff'd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (App. Div.), appeal
dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980) which was relied upon by
the defendant. It found that Edwards never signed a statement binding him to the provisions of
an employee handbook and while Edwards was alleging the existence of a contract for life
employment, Weiner was merely maintaining that the manual gave rise to a contract for
termination for just cause. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., No. 104, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Sept. 26, 1980), rev'd, 83 A.D.2d 810, 442 N.Y.S.2d 11 (App. Div. 1981), rev'd, 57 N.Y.2d 458,
443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982). For a discussion of the Edwards case see infra text
accompanying notes 96-100.
26 Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 83 A.D.2d 810, 811,442 N.Y.S.2d 11, 12 (App. Div. 1981),
rev'd, 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982). The court stated that the
plaintiff could terminate his employment-at-will and correspondingly the defendant possessed
the same right. Further, the court believed that the company was free to unilaterally amend
provisions set forth in the handbook. Id.
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rely on them. 27 The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the
decision of the appellate division, and, stressing the significance of the
facts alleged by the plaintiff, found that the complaint stated a valid
28
cause of action for breach of an employment contract.
The English law doctrine of master and servant was characterized by a paternalistic relationship. 2 In the nineteenth century, however, drastic changes occurred as a result of the competitive business
practices which developed during the Industrial Revolution. 30 This
economic climate fostered a change in the doctrine of master and
servant, and the rigid class structure which had formerly maintained
the relationship was replaced by freedom of contract principles.3 1 As a
result, the parties were considered to be free to bargain and to limit
32
their commitment to each other.

Id. (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
57 N.Y.2d at 462, 443 N.E.2d at 443, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
29 See P. SELZNICK, LAW, SocETY AND INDUSTTRAL JUSTICE 122-23 (1969); DeGiuseppe, supra
note 1, at 4-5; Comment, Employment at Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUFFALO L. REV.
211, 212-13 (1973). From the 14th to the 19th centuries the structure and necessities of an
agrarian society shaped the terms of employment. P. SELZNICK, supra, at 122. As circumstances
often required the servant to work directly within the master's household, a paternalistic
relationship developed. Id. at 123. Several aspects of the master/servant relationship illustrated
this paternalistic nature: the master could discipline the servant (with moderation), assumed
responsibility for his misconduct, and was expected to provide for his general welfare. Id. at 12428.
30 P. SELZNICK, supra note 29, at 130-31.
11 Id. at 131.
32 See id. The emphasis, however, was not on the employee's freedom to bargain for job
27

28

security; rather the employer's freedom to terminate employees was deemed fundamental. Note,
supra note 1, at 343. The contract theory of employment contained four presumptions: 1)
because it was contractual in nature, the job relationship could be governed by the law of
contract; 2) rules and working conditions were incorporated as implied terms of the contract;
3) the employment contract had a special status drawn from the old law of master and servantthe employer had authority over the employee; and 4) the employment contract was terminable
at will. P. SELZNICK, supra note 29, at 131-32. It has been suggested that the employer's
advantage in the employment relationship was encompassed in the doctrine of freedom of
enterprise. Note, supra note 1, at 343. In America, the influence of laissez-faire principles
flourished, resulting in the articulation of the at-will rule by H. Wood in 1877. See supra note 2.
Although the rule was formulated with little precedent it was adopted in several states. Martin v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895) is often cited as the authority
incorporating Wood's Rule into American common law: "The decisions on this point in the lower
courts have not been uniform, but we think the rule is correctly stated by Mr. Wood." Id. at 121,
42 N.E. at 471; see Blumrosen, Worker's Rights Against Employers and Unions: Justice Francis-A Judge For Our Season, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 480, 481 (1970); DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at
6; Comment, supra note 29, at 216; Note, supra note 1, at 344; see also Greer v. Arlington Mills
Mfg. Co., 43 Del. 581, 43 A. 609 (1899) (indefinite hiring is terminable at-will); Harrod v.
Wineman, 146 Iowa 718, 125 N.W. 812 (1910) (indefinite employment terminable at-will by
either party); Edwards v. Seaboard & R.R., 121 N.C. 490, 28 S.E. 137 (1897) (hiring to pay
wages at specific time intervals does not convert indefinite hiring to hiring of definite duration).
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In advancing the freedom of enterprise doctrine, courts utilized
formal contract principles which ultimately operated to the disadvantage of the employee. 33 Manifestation of assent, mutuality of obligation, and consideration were three contract principles which the
courts articulated in their findings of at-will employment.3 4 Thus, the
courts held that an at-will employment relationship existed unless the
parties specified a definite duration of employment. 35 The courts
stressed that because an employee had the freedom to leave his job,
mutuality of obligation required that an employer have the corresponding right to discharge the employee for any or no cause. 36 Similarly, the courts found that additional consideration was necessary to
support a promise of employment for a fixed term. 37 Prior employee
service was viewed as past consideration, inadequate to uphold such
an agreement. Service to the employer guaranteed the employee only
the right to compensation in the form of wages and would not protect
him from termination at the will of his employer. 38
Despite the demise of laissez-faire policies 39 and the subsequent
modification of the traditional contract principles of mutuality and
Several commentators have indicated that the cases Wood cited not only were weak
authority, but contradicted his proposition. DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 6 n.13; Note, supra
note 1, at 341 n.54.
33 Comment, supra note 1, at 1825.
34 Murg & Scharman, Employment At Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23
B.C.L. REv. 329, 336 (1982).
35 Comment, supra note 1, at 1825.
31 Blades, supra note 1, at 1419.
31 Riefkin v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 290 F. 286 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Odum v. Bush,
125 Ga. 184, 53 S.E. 1013 (1906); Rape v. Mobile & 0. R.R., 136 Miss. 38, 100 So. 585 (1924);
Blades, supra note 1, at 1420.
3' Blades, supra note 1, at 1420; see also Murg & Scharman, supra note 34, at 337-38; Note,
supra note 1, at 351-52.
31 Historically, freedom of contract principles were considered necessary to foster economic
growth. Comment, supra note 1, at 1826. The courts were often reluctant to interfere with
freedom of contract principles as applied to employment contracts: they viewed the employer as
free to set the conditions of employment, and the employee as having the correlative right to
accept them. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908); Comment, supra note 1, at 1826. In both Adair and Coppage the Supreme Court
invalidated legislation which prohibited the employer from discharging employees who had
joined a labor union. Coppage, 236 U.S. at 26; Adair, 208 U.S. at 176; Blades, supra note 1, at
1416-17.
By 1937, however, the Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
departed from the laissez-faire approach to the employment relation. Recognizing the inequality
in bargaining between the employer and the employee, the Court upheld legislation which
protected the right of the employee to unionize and enjoined the employer from interference
with that right. Blades, supra note 1, at 1418. Thus, freedom to form employment contracts was
tempered by a broader concern for equality and fairness in dealings between employers and
employees. Comment, supra note 1, at 1826; see generally Blades, supra note 1, at 1418-19;
Murg & Scharman, supra note 34, at 338-40. Subsequent federal legislation prohibiting discrimi-
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adequacy of consideration, 40 the employment-at-will doctrine remains
the law in most jurisdictions today. 4' Courts have, however, found
ways to limit the employer's right to terminate employment at-will.
For example, a limitation on the employer's right to terminate at-will
has been found through the imposition of an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. In Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 42 the
plaintiff alleged that he was discharged, after eighteen years of service, for his union-organizing efforts. 43 The California court was faced
with determining whether a long-term employee hired for an indefinite duration could be discharged at-will. 44 The court found that
California law limited an employer's absolute right to discharge when
an employee had provided additional consideration or there was an
implied or express condition restricting the right to discharge for good
cause. 45 The Cleary court reasoned that the employee's length of
service and the employer's express policy concerning employee griev46
ances and dismissals created an implied contract for job security.
The implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent
in all contracts applied to employment contracts, thereby limiting the
employer's power to arbitrarily deprive the employee of the benefits of
the employment contract. 47 In establishing a grievance policy, the
employer had recognized its duty to act in good faith. 48 Therefore, the
natory discharges and retaliatory discharges for exercising statutory and constitutional rights
placed restrictions on the absolute right to terminate employment. See National Labor Relations
Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(3) (1976) (prohibits retaliatory discharges for union
organizing); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2 (1976) (prohibits
discrimination based on race, sex, color, religion, or national origin in hiring or discharging);
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152(a) (1976) (protects the right to join labor unions
without fear of discharge).
40 Consideration is essential to the validity of a contract; mutuality of obligatation is not
required unless the values exchanged between the parties are so unbalanced that the contract
becomes unenforceable. Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin, 1 F.2d 687, 688 (3d Cir. 1924);
Murg & Scharman, supra note 34, at 337 n.49; see generally A. CORBIN, I CORBIN ON CONTRAcrS
§§ 109-52 (1950 & Supp. 1971).
4 Murg & Scharman, supra note 34, at 321 n.2 lists representative cases from all state
jurisdictions.
12 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980).
" Id. at 447, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724. The plaintiff asserted that he was discharged without a
complete investigation after he was accused of theft, leaving his work area, and threatening a
fellow employee. He maintained that the real reason for his dismissal was his union-organizing
activities. Id.
44 Id. at 446, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
" Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (citing Drzewiecki v. H. & R. Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App.
3d 695, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Ct. App. 1972)).
" Id. at 446, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
41 Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The employee had accrued pension and retirement
benefits, membership in the credit union, and seniority. Id. at 448, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
" Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
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Cleary court held that the employee's longevity of service and the
express company policy estopped the employer from discharging the
49
employee without good cause.

A minority of jurisdictions consider all of the circumstances in
ascertaining the parties' intentions regarding the duration of employment. 50 Identifiable factors such as consideration,
' 52

51

the "common law

53

of the job,
and longevity of employment can give rise to an
implied-in-fact contract, 54 which then creates enforceable employee
rights. 55 In 1981 a California appellate court in Pugh v. See's Candies,
11Id. Other courts have also found that the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair
dealing extends to employment contracts. In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316
A.2d 549 (1974), the plaintiff alleged that she was fired for resisting the advances of her foreman.
In upholding the jury finding that she was maliciously discharged, the court stated that termination of an at-will employee exercised in bad faith or malice offends the public good and amounts
to a breach of contract. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551. The court's language was somewhat
confusing, however, in that it found the duty to terminate in good faith arising from a public
policy or interest rather than one implied from contract. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551; see also
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (salesman's
written contract terminable at-will carried an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
w Note, supra note 1, at 351; see Denis v. Thermoid Co., 128 N.J.L. 303, 25 X.2d 886 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1942) (examination of surrounding circumstances to determine duration); Eilen v.
Tappin's Inc., 16 N.J. Super. 53, 83 A.2d 817 (Law Div. 1951) (same). This approach is said to
be modeled after the English rule that the presumption of an at-will employment can be rebutted
by proof of circumstances surrounding the transaction. H. WooD, supra note 2, § 134, at 271 &
n.5. Indeed, Wood himself characterized an indefinite hiring as a prima facie hiring at will and
indicated that a plaintiff could establish a definite hiring with proof. Id. The Weiner court also
interpreted the doctrine of employment-at-will as a rebuttable presumption. See infra note 117
and accompanying text.
51 Note, supra note 1, at 351. A plaintiff could prove the intent to create a permanent
employment by the showing of additional or separate consideration, which is characterized as a
benefit enjoyed by the employer or significant reliance by the employee. Id. at 351-52. Benefits
to the employer can include surrender of tort claims or employee contribution to the business. Id.
at 352-53. Reliance by the employee includes the sale of the employee's business to pursue the
employment, changing jobs, or moving. Id. at 354-55, The authors also suggest that a recruiter
may, with a particular demeanor or approach, induce a potential employee to undertake other
actions to his detriment. Id. at 355.
s1 Id. at 356-59. The "common law" of the job is a neutral concept which may establish the
terms of the employment agreement when they have not been expressly stated. Id. at 356. The
common law of the job can be determined by the company policy expressed in manuals or
handbooks, the nature of the job itself, or the custom of the industry. Id. at 356-59.
-o Id. at 361-64. Longevity in the employment can also be used to show the intention of the
parties as to the duration of the contract and retains a special meaning today because compensation often includes participation in pension and health care plans. Id. at 361. Because time in
service creates employee rights to pension plans and fringe benefits, longevity can be considered
as establishing implied contractual rights. In addition, it provides a separate consideration when
the employee declines another offer to preserve the benefits he believes have accrued. Id. at 36264.
u Id. at 368. The authors of that Note proposed the use of contract principles to ameliorate
the harshness of the at-will rule. Id.
5 The doctrine of promissory estoppel also has been occasionally applied in employment-atwill cases. See, e.g., Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981)

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:396

Inc.,5 6 applied elements of the foregoing analysis and determined that
the plaintiff had presented facts from which a jury could find the
existence of an implied promise that the employer would not act
arbitrarily in dealing with the employee. 57 The plaintiff had been
employed by the defendant for thirty-two years, working his way up
from pot-washer to vice-president in charge of production and member of the board of directors. 58 The plaintiff, who had never received
criticism of his work, 59 alleged the reason for his dismissal was his
refusal to acquiesce to a "sweetheart" contract in which one company
obtains an unfair competitive advantage over another by paying employees at a lower wage rate with the permission of the union. 60 The
court stated that California law allowed discharges for good cause
only upon either a showing of independent consideration 6 1 or the
finding of an express or implied agreement to terminate only for
cause. 62 The court found that the company policy of terminating
executives for cause only, 63 as well as the length of Pugh's employment
and the commendations and promotions he had received, established
the existence of an implied promise.6 4
Employees also have been successful in bringing wrongful dis65
charge actions by challenging dismissals as violative of public policy.
While some jurisdictions apply contract principles in finding public
policy violations, most courts impose tort liability to protect against

(promissory estoppel theory applied where employer left former job in reliance on job offer made
by defendant). The doctrines of promissory estoppel and employment-at-will, however, differ in
focus. Promissory estoppel is used to prevent injustice to a promisee who failed to give consideration to bind a contract but nevertheless has acted reasonably in reliance on the promise and has
suffered a significant detriment. Fuchs, Promissory Estoppel and Employment Agreements, 49
N.Y.ST. B.J. 386 (1977). In employment contracts, the doctrine's application contemplates
detrimental reliance by the employee. Under the employment-at-will doctrine, a promise of job
security is not enforced against the employer unless he has received a benefit in addition to the
employee services; it gives no effect to the detrimental reliance suffered by the employee. See
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
51 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981).
57 Id. at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
58 Id. at 315-16, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 918-19.
59 Id. at 317-18, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
10 Id. at 318-19, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
Id. at 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925. Independent consideration is synonymous with addiI6
tional consideration. See Blades, supra note 1, at 1419. The term denotes consideration other
than services to be performed. 116 Cal. App. 3d at 325, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924; see also supra note
38 and accompanying text.
12 116 Cal. App. 3d at 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
63 Id. at 317, 171 Cal. Bptr. at 919.
14 Id. at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
65 See generally DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 30-34; Murg & Scharman, supra note 34, at
343-44; Comment, supra note 1, at 1822.
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such discharges.6 6 Tort law protects the personal interests and freedom of the individual;6 7 thus, when an employer discharges for a bad
cause he breaches a duty "imposed by law, and . ..based primarily
upon social policy." 16 8 Jurisdictions have upheld wrongful discharge

actions when the employee has been terminated for refusing to commit a criminal act, 69 for exercising a statutorily created right,70 or for
serving on jury duty. 7 1 Several courts have been careful to limit the
application of the public policy exception through the imposition of a
"clear mandate" standard. 72 Those jurisdictions assert that the articulation of public policy should emanate from the legislature and not
from the courts, 73 and therefore, to maintain the action, a plaintiff
7
must identify a declared public interest. 1
Recently, courts have dealt with cases in which the employee
maintained that the issuance of a personnel manual or handbook
86 See Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 36, 432 A.2d 464, 467-68 (1981)
(action for wrongful discharge can be brought in contract or tort); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,
114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (wrongful discharge for breach of employment contract);
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980)(implied provision in
employment contract that employee will not be discharged in violation of clear mandate of
public policy; wrongful discharge action may be brought in contract, tort, or both); see also
DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 30.
07 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 92 (4th ed. 1971).
68 Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176, 610 P.2d 1330, 1335, 164 Cal.

Rptr. 839, 844 (1980) (quoting W. PROSSER, supra note 67, § 92, at 613 (4th ed. 1971)); see
generally Blades, supra note 1, at 1421-27. California was the first state to impose a public policy
restriction on the right to terminate at-will. Murg & Scharman, supra note 34, at 344.
66 Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d
25 (Ct. App. 1959). In Petermann, the plaintiff alleged that he was discharged for his refusal to
commit perjury. Id. at 187, 344 P.2d at 26. The court stated that it would offend public policy to
allow an employer to discharge an at-will employee for refusing to commit a criminal act. Id. at
189, 344 P.2d at 27; see also Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (employer has duty to uphold fundamental public policy reflected in
state's penal code).
10 See Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (discharge
wrongful where termination in retaliation for filing worker's compensation claim); see also
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 I11.
2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (same); Lally v. Copygraphics,
85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981) (same).
11 See Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (discharge wrongful if based on
employee having served on jury duty).
72 See Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456
Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174(1974).
13 Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 45, 432 A.2d 464, 472 (1981) (expression
of public policy more aptly relegated to legislature); cf. Murphy v. American Home Prods.
Corp., 58 N.Y. 2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983) (court refused to recognize cause
of action in tort for wrongful discharge, holding recognition must come from legislation).
14 See supra note 73. In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505
(1980), the court stated that the sources of public policy include legislation, administrative rules,
regulations, or decisions, and judicial decisions. Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
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established contract rights between himself and the employer. 75 In
Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 78 a 1976 Kansas case, the
plaintiff alleged that the policy manual provision "[no employee shall
77
be dismissed without just cause" created an employment for life.
Affirming the common law rule that a contract for permanent employment was an indefinite hiring absent additional consideration or
an express or implied agreement specifying duration, the court found
that the manual established no such agreement. 78 Instead, the court
found that the manual was nothing more than a unilateral expression
of company policy; its terms were not bargained for and, therefore, it
79
did not express a meeting of the minds.
" See, e.g., Beidler v. W.R. Grace, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aJJ'd mem.,
609 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1979); Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982);
Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (Ct. App. 1975); Johnson v. National
Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308,
299 N.W. 2d 147 (1980); Dickhaus v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., A-3281-80-T2 (N.J. App.
Div. Nov. 13, 1981), certif. denied, 89 N.J. 430, 446 A.2d 156 (1982); Edwards v. Citibank,
N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1979), af-'d, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d
327 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980);
Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1978), a-f'd
mem., 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 396
N.E.2d 207, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979); see also DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 45.
Generally, the plaintiffs in these actions assert that the manuals imply an agreement for
permanent or life employment. See above cited cases. Plaintiffs also have contended that
employment manuals restrict the employer's right to terminate to the reasons explicitly enumerated in the handbook. See Wagner v. Sperry Univac, 458 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978), ajf'd
mem., 624 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1980); Beidler v. W. R. Grace, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa.
1978), af-'d mem., 609 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1979); Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d
1095 (Del. 1982); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980);
Dickhaus v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., A-3281-80-T2 (N.J. App. Div. Nov. 13, 1981),
certif. denied, 89 N.J. 430, 446 A.2d 156 (1982); Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d
1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1978), affd mem., 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App.
Div.), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 396 N.E.2d 207, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979).
76 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976).
" Id. at 54, 551 P.2d at 781-82. The plaintiff was employed as a "beef lugger"; he incurred
an injury on the job which rendered him unable to lift heavy objects. Id. at 53, 551 P.2d at 781.
Consequently he was transferred to another job. He was terminated when he informed his
supervisor that he was unable to perform the heavy lifting. Id.
" Id. at 54-55, 551 P.2d at 781-82.
71 Id. In Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980), the Nebraska
court followed Johnson in deciding that even if the booklet were part of the employment
contract, the employment was still terminable at-will where no agreement fixing the duration of
the employment could be shown. Id. at 314-15, 299 N.W.2d at 151. Courts have applied the
same analysis where plaintiffs have alleged that termination is restricted to a cause specified in
the personnel manual. See Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982)
(company rules enumerated in manual not all encompassing); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind.
App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (Ct. App. 1975) (handbook must specify duration to be enforceable as
contract); Dickhaus v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., A-3281-80-T2 (N.J. App. Div. Nov. 13,
1981) (company rules enumerated in manual not all encompassing), certif. denied, 89 N.J. 430,
446 A.2d 156 (1982); Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737
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A contrary result was reached in Toussaint v.Blue Cross & Blue
Shield s° where the Michigan Supreme Court was faced with facts
similar to those of the Weiner case and decided that handbook provisions restricting the right to termination could create enforceable
rights. 8 ' The court noted that Michigan law required a showing of
distinguishing features in the contract or additional consideration to
rebut the presumption that an indefinite hiring was terminable atwill. 82 This rule, however, did not prevent an employer who has hired
an employee for an indefinite term from agreeing to a termination for
cause.8 3 The plaintiff in Toussaint had specifically discussed job security during his interview and was assured that as long as he performed
his job he would not be dismissed. 8 4 Toussaint was given a manual
which limited dismissal to " 'just cause only.' "5 The court decided
that a company policy made known to the plaintiff was sufficient to
create "distinguishing features or provisions" and to rebut the pre86
sumption that the employment was terminable at-will.

(Sup. Ct. 1978) (manual not contract and therefore not exclusive grounds for discharge), aJJ'd
mem., 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 396
N.E.2d 207, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979). In Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095
(Del. 1982), the Delaware Supreme Court held that the employee booklet did not change the
plaintiffs at-will employment status because it lacked a specific period of employment. Id. at
1097. Further, the list of offenses justifying dismissal were not "inclusive, but illustrative." Id.
Plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in alleging that the procedure for termination was not
followed. For example, in Beidler v. W.R. Grace, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd
mer., 609 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1979), the district court dismissed the plaintiff's breach of contract
claim which alleged the employer failed to follow company procedure. Id. at 1016. The court
applied Pennsylvania law in finding that there was no restriction on an employer's absolute right
to discharge absent a clear violation of public policy. Id. at 1015.
11 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
8'Id. at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 885. The court held:
1) a provision of an employment contract providing that an employee shall not
be discharged except for cause is legally enforceable although the contract is not for a
definite term-the term is "indefinite,"and
2) such a provision may become part of the contract either by express agreement, oral or written; or as a result of an employee's legitimate expectations
grounded in an employer's policy statements.

Id.
83

Id. at 610, 292 N.W.2d at 890. The court stated that:
When a prospective employee inquires about job security and the employer agrees
that the employee shall be employed as long as he does the job, a fair construction is
that the employer has agreed to give up his right to discharge at will without
assigning cause and may discharge only for cause (good or just cause).

Id.
Id. at 597, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
8 Id. at 597-98, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
80 Id. at 596, 614, 292 N.W.2d at 883, 892.
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The Toussaint court maintained that its ruling was consistent
with past decisions recognizing the contractual rights to employee
benefits, bonuses, and pensions published in personnel manuals, 87 and
held that a company manual providing for termination for cause
created similar contractual rights.8 8 The Toussaint court further
found that clearly expressed policies and practices implicitly created
contractual rights.8 9
Traditionally, New York has followed those jurisdictions which
do not recognize a restriction on the right to terminate at-will through
the publication of a personnel policy manual. 90 In Chin v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 91 a 1978 case, the plaintiff alleged that
the "Code of Conduct" issued by American Telephone & Telegraph
established exclusive grounds for discharge. 92 The lower court cited
Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co. 93 in ruling that the manual did
not create a contract for a specific term. 94 The court stated that the
handbook lacked the necessary elements of an employment contract
because it failed to define duties, duration of employment, and compensation. Consequently, the manual could not alter the plaintiff's
employee-at-will status.9 5
In Edwards v. Citibank, N.A.,9" the New York appellate division
found that a company manual defining the conditions of employment
did not change the plaintiff's at-will employment status since the
employer could alter or withdraw the manual at any time.9 7 The
Edwards court stated that the list of causes for dismissal in the manual

87 Id. at 614-19, 292 N.W.2d at 892-94; Cain v. Allen Elec. & Equip. Co., 346 Mich. 568, 78
N.W.2d 296 (1956) (personnel policy established contractual right to severance pay); see Psutka
v. Michigan Alkali Co., 274 Mich. 318, 264 N.W. 385 (1936) (benefit plan is contract supported
by employee's continued and quality performance); Gaydos v. White Motor Corp., 54 Mich.
App. 143, 220 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1974) (adoption of severance pay policy is unilateral
contract accepted by employee's continued performance).
" 408 Mich. at 618-19, 292 N.W.2d at 894.
89 Id. at 617, 292 N.W.2d at 893-94 (citing Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)).
o See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text; see generally DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at
46.
91 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aj'fd mem., 70 A.D.2d 791, 416
N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 396 N.E.2d 207, 421 N.Y.S. 2d 1028
(1979).
92 Id. at 1072, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
'3 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
" 96 Misc. 2d at 1073, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
o Id.
96 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup.Ct. 1979), aff'd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d
327 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980).
17 Edwards v. Citibank, N.A.,
74 A.D.2d 553, 554, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (App. Div.),
appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980).
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was not exclusive, and that it did not afford the employee a right to
permanent employment merely because he did not violate a specified
provision for termination."" In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kupferman maintained that policies defining the terms of employment voluntarily set forth by the employer could create a mutuality of obligation which either party could enforce. 9 An employee could
detrimentally rely on such policies, thereby estopping the employer
from violating them. 0 °
The Weiner decision, however, indicates that a company policy
manual can be incorporated into an agreement restricting the right to
terminate. In deciding that an employment manual can create enforceable contract rights between an employer and an employee,' 01
the Weiner court noted that the laissez-faire philosophy which had
contributed to the acceptance of the at-will rule by the American legal
system in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had lost considerable
02
influence. 1
The court initially determined that Weiner's claim was not
barred by the Statute of Frauds because the terms of the agreement
between Weiner and McGraw-Hill did not preclude performance of
the contract within one year. 103 The court then turned to its discussion

98

Id., 425 N.Y.S.2d at 328-29 (citing Chin, 96 Misc. 2d at 1073, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 739).

See id., 425 N.Y.S.2d at 329 (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
1o0See id. In Wernham v. Moore, 77 A.D.2d 262, 432 N.Y.S.2d 711 (App. Div. 1980), the
plaintiff claimed that the defendant (Episcopal Mission Society) failed to follow the termination
procedures jointly developed by the defendant and employees. Unlike the manuals in Chin and
Edwards the manual contained terms bargained for by both parties and therefore was distinguishable from a company manual unilaterally setting forth terms and conditions of employment. The appellate division held that in New York, separate agreements could serve to alter the
at-will status of an employee. Id. at 265, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 713.
10' 57 N.Y.2d at 462, 443 N.E.2d at 443, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 195. Justice Fuchsberg also noted
that abusive discharge, implied promise of fair treatment, and good faith were other theories
upon which wrongful discharge actions have been upheld, but declined to discuss them since he
found that an allegation of the existence of a contract was sufficient to state a claim. Id.
10*Id. at 462-63, 443 N.E.2d at 443-44, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 195-96. The court cited Martin v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895) for its adoption of the at-will rule
articulated by Wood. 57 N.Y.2d at 463, 443 N.E.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196. The court
recognized the questionable authority upon which the employment-at-will rule was based. Id. at
463 n.5, 443 N.E.2d at 444 n.5, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196 n.5; see DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 6
n.3. The court noted the Supreme Court's acceptance of the employment-at-will rule in Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). 57 N.Y.2d at 463,
443 N.E.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196. Commentators continue to advocate modification of
the at-will rule to achieve job security through legislative action. Committee on Labor and
Employment Law, At-Will Employment and The Problem of Unjust Dismissal, reprinted in J.
BARBASH, J. FEERICK & J. KAUFF, UNJUST DISMISSAL AND AT WILL EMPLOYMENT 155 (1982);
Blades, supra note 1.
113 57 N.Y.2d at 463, 443 N.E.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196. The court acknowledged that
defendant McGraw-Hill had not affirmatively pleaded the defense of the Statute of Frauds in its
"
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of the contract action and stated that Weiner's freedom to terminate
the employment did not defeat the creation of a binding agreement if
he provided other consideration. 0 4 In drawing this conclusion, the
majority distinguished the principle of consideration from that of
mutuality of obligation.10 5 The court determined that mutuality involves reciprocal promises of equal value, while consideration requires
only a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee.106 Thus,
while mutuality creates an enforceable contract, the court found that
it was not necessary to have promises which were of equal weight as
long as the promisor had derived a benefit or the promisee had in0 7
curred a detriment.1
The majority determined that an agreement by the employer to
dismiss an employee only for just cause and after rehabilitative efforts
prove unsuccessful does not necessarily result in an employment-atwill relationship.10 8 In support of its holding, the court noted that in
contracts of definite duration, the employer can be barred from dismissing the employee without cause after the commencement of services.1'9 In such contracts it is well established that although the emresponding brief to the court of appeals. Id. The defendant, however, had raised the defense in
its motion to dismiss the complaint in the lower court. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., No. 104,
slip op. at 1-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 26, 1980), rev'd, 83 A.D.2d 810, 442 N.Y.S.2d 11 (App. Div.
1981), rev'd, 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982). Special Term found that
the existence of an application signed by both the plaintiff and defendant was a sufficient writing
to remove the bar of the Statute of Frauds. Id.; see North Shore Bottling Co. v. C. Schmidt &
Sons, Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 171, 175-76, 239 N.E.2d 189, 191, 292 N.Y.S.2d 86, 89 (1968) (Statute of
Frauds not applicable if contract, although capable of performance in one year, can continue for
indefinite duration); N.Y. GEN. OBLIc. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney Supp. 1983) (Statute of Frauds);
see also Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App. 254, 283 N.W.2d 713 (Ct. App.
1979) (Statute of Frauds not violated when contract capable of completion within year extends
for longer period).
10157 N.Y.2d at 463-64, 443 N.E.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
105Id. at 464, 443 N.E.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
0' Id. (citing Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin, 1 F.2d 687, 688 (3d Cir. 1924); Clausen &
Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968)).
07 Id. (citing Holt v. Feigenbaum, 52 N.Y.2d 291, 299, 419 N.E.2d 332, 336, 437 N.Y.S.2d
654, 658 (1981)); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75. The consideration given by the
promisor could take the form of a reciprocal promise, action, forebearance, or detriment. Hamer
v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891).
The court stated: "Far from consideration needing to be coextensive or even proportionate,
the value or measurability of the thing forborne or promised is not crucial so long as it is
acceptable to the promisee." 57 N.Y.2d at 464, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
10857 N.Y.2d at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197; accord Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d
at 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 917 (implied promise of just cause dismissal); Cleary, 1l1 Cal. App. 3d
at 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 722 (longevity of service and company policy imply just cause
dismissal); Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 579, 292 N.W.2d at 880 (policy manual creates express or
implied promise of just cause dismissal).
10957 N.Y.2d at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197. The court cited Corbin on
Contracts:
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ployee makes no reciprocal promise and still reserves the right to leave
the employment at-will, the employer cannot terminate him without
1 10
cause if the employee had been hired for a specific time period.
The court found the facts alleged by Weiner sufficient to adduce
a contract and a possible breach.'I' The court emphasized the plaintiff's allegations that McGraw-Hill had initially induced Weiner to
leave Prentice-Hall and had limited his dismissal to cause on the
McGraw-Hill application form." 2 Relying on this guarantee, Weiner
had refused subsequent job offers." 3 In addition, Weiner's superiors
had insisted that his own supervisory actions be governed by the policy
manual." 4 The court found that these factors were sufficient to allege
that the manual created a contract restricting McGraw-Hill's power5
of termination and binding the company to attempt rehabilitation.1
The Weiner court also stressed that the court in Martin v. New
York Life Insurance Co.1

6

had articulated the employment-at-will

[I]f the employer made a promise, either express or implied, not only to pay for the
service but also that the employment should continue for a period of time that is
either definite or capable of being determined, that employment is not terminable by
him "at will" after the employee has begun or rendered some of the requested service
or has given any other consideration. . . . This is true even though the employee has
made no return promise and has retained the power and legal privilege of terminating the employment "at will". The employer's promise is supported by the service
that has been begun or rendered or by the other executed consideration.
Id. (quoting A. CORBIN, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRAcrs § 152 (1960 & Supp. 1971)); see also Pugh, 116
Cal. App. 3d at 325, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925 (employee's services consideration for both salary and
just cause dismissal); St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Booker, 5 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928)
(consideration to uphold promise for continued employment found in continued job performance); Comment, supra note 1, at 1819-20.
1"057 N.Y.2d at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197; Stauter v. Walnut Grove
Prods., 188 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Iowa 1971) (mutuality not necessary to hold contract enforceable); Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885 (same); Murg & Scharman, supra note
34, at 337 n.49; see Note, supra note 1, at 367 n.209.
"1 57 N.Y.2d at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
t2 Id.
13 Id.
14 57 N.Y.S.2d at 466, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
"I Id.; see also Wernham v. Moore, 77 A.D.2d 262, 432 N.Y.S.2d 711 (App. Div. 1980)
(ancillary bilateral agreement may amend terms of an employment contract otherwise terminable at-will); cf. Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 161, 156 N.E.2d 297, 299, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577,
580 (1959) (collective bargaining agreement may restrict right to terminate employee hired atwill). The majority addressed the concern raised by the dissenting justices that an unfavorable
reception of the decision by industry would force employers out of the state. 57 N.Y.2d at 466
n.7, 443 N.E.2d at 446 n.7, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198 n.7. The court noted that states such as
California, Michigan, and Massachusetts, which recognize exceptions to the at-will rule, have
not suffered these consequences. Id. The court cited personnel management authorities who
support the proposition that job security does not adversely affect work productivity. Id.; see
Committee on Labor and Employment Law, supra note 102, at 175-76; Pascale, Personnel
Practices and Employee Attitudes; A Study of Japanese and American-Managed Firms in the
United States, 31 HuM. REL. 597 (1978).
116 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
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rule as a presumption which could be rebutted by attending facts and
circumstances."1 ' The court emphasized that an isolated act or the
singular intent of defendant McGraw-Hill was not controlling and
that the conduct of the parties, preliminary negotiations, and writings
had to be considered in their entirety in order to determine the
intention of the parties. 1 8 Accordingly, the court reversed the decision
of the appellate division dismissing the action and reinstated the order
of the Special Term upholding the breach of contract claim.119
In a dissenting opinion, 120 Justice Wachtler stated that the employment-at-will rule has long been upheld in New York.12 He found
that in order to defeat the presumption of employment-at-will, an
employee must show an agreement specifying the duration of employment.12 2 Neither the statement in the employee manual nor the reference to it in the application, nor the two taken together evidenced an
intention by McGraw-Hill to be bound to its contents.12 3 Accordingly,
the dissent asserted that the plaintiffs allegations did not sufficiently
24
state a contract in contravention of an at-will employment status.
Justice Wachtler stressed the significance of the substance and
format of the application.12 He found that the application lacked the
necessary terms of employment and that therefore no evidence of an
offer or acceptance of employment was presented. 2 6 In addition, the
format of the application defeated the implication of a contractual
agreement between Weiner and McGraw-Hill12 7 because the signa"7 57 N.Y.2d at 466, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198; see supra notes 50-64 and
accompanying text.
"1 57 N.Y.2d at 466, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198; see Brown Bros. Elec.
Contractors, Inc. v. Beam Constr. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 397, 399-400, 361 N.E.2d 999, 1001, 393
N.Y.S.2d 350, 352 (1977) (parties' objective intent gleaned from totality of surrounding circumstances); see also Drzewiecki v. H. & R. Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 703, 101 Cal. Rptr.
169, 174 (Ct. App. 1972) (intention of parties as to employment contract construed from
attendant circumstances).
"1 57 N.Y.2d at 467, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
12o Id. Justice Gabrielli concurred in the dissent. Id. at 469, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d
at 199.
121 Id. at 467, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (Wachtler, J., dissenting); see Martin,
148 N.Y. at 117, 42 N.E.2d at 416.
2 57 N.Y.2d at 467, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (Wachtler, J., dissenting); see
supra notes 77-79, 90-97 and accompanying text.
"1 57 N.Y.2d at 467, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (Wachtler, J., dissenting); see
supra notes 77-79, 90-97 and accompanying text.
124 57 N.Y.2d at 467, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
Id. at 467-68, 443 N.E.2d at 446-47, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198-99 (Wachtler, J., dissenting);
Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 9 n.6.
11657 N.Y.2d at 467, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (Wachtler, J., dissenting);
Johnson, 220 Kan. at 54, 551 P.2d at 782; Chin, 96 Misc. 2d at 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
12' 57 N.Y.2d at 468, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198-99 (Wachtler, J., dissenting);
Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 9 n.6.
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tures of the company officials were subsequently affixed under captions entitled "[R]ecord of [E]mployment . . ." and "Additional Approval." 1 28 Their purpose, according to the dissent, served not to bind
1 29
the defendant, but rather to record the hiring for company use.
Further, the manual was devoid of any language indicating an intent
by McGraw-Hill to be bound to its provisions, 30 and thus McGrawHill could alter its policy and procedures at any time.' 3' In effect the
handbook set forth general company guidelines and as such evinced
no elements of an employment contract. 31 2 Justice Wachtler cautioned
against interpreting the manual and application form liberally. 133 He
stated that public policy militated against an imposition on the employer's right to discharge.134 Employers wishing to evade costly and
time-consuming litigation would retain unsatisfactory employees, resulting in a loss of efficiency and productivity in the workplace. 135 In
Justice Wachtler's opinion, the majority's construction of these instruments as an employment contract threatened the viability of an econ6
omy already burdened by high unemployment and loss of industry. 13
The Weiner decision represents a limitation on the employmentat-will rule by stating that an employment for an indefinite duration
37
can nevertheless carry with it a restriction on the right to terminate.1
Although the parties are not equally bound to the same terms, an
employee can enforce the right to a just cause dismissal by providing
138
consideration for the promise.
128 57 N.Y.2d at 468, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198-99 (Wachtler, J., dissenting);

Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 9 n.6.
12957 N.Y.2d at 468, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
13 Id.

131Id.; see supra notes 79, 97 and accompanying text.
13257 N.Y.2d at 468, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (Wachtler, J., dissenting); see
supra notes 78, 95 and accompanying text.
13157 N.Y.2d at 468, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
134Id.; see also Committee on Labor and Employment Law, supra note 102, at 175; DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 69; Comment, supra note 1, at 1842.
13557 N.Y.2d at 468-69, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
136Id. at 469, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
137Id. at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197; see Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 579, 292
N.W.2d at 880 where the Michigan court could find no authority for the proposition that a
hiring for an indefinite duration " 'cannot be made other than terminable at will by a provision
that states that an employee will not be discharged except for cause.' " Id. at 611, 292 N.W.2d at
890-91 (quoting Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 79 Mich. App. 429, 435, 262 N.W.2d
848, 851 (Ct. App. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (emphasis omitted)). Contra Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982) (an indefinite
hiring cannot be restricted by a just cause dismissal by statements made in manuals); Shaw v.
S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (Ct. App. 1975) (same); Johnson, 220 Kan. at
52, 551 P.2d at 779 (same). For a discussion of the emerging trend to recognize contractual rights
to a just cause dismissal as stated in employment manuals see Murg & Scharman, supra note 34,
at 367-72.
"' 57 N.Y.2d at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
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In finding that Weiner had presented evidence of additional
consideration for the promise of job security, the court departed from
traditional employment contract analysis. 139 The court stressed that
changing jobs, relinquishing fringe benefits, or a rejection of subsequent offers of employment could provide the consideration to create
contractual rights. 40 Recognizing these factors in this light represents
an expansion of the concept of additional consideration. 14' Previously,
a job change or the rejection of other offers was regarded as a natural
incident to the acceptance of employment, 142 and therefore failed to
satisfy the consideration requirement. Only when the employee had
suffered a detriment of consequence, such as the relinquishment of
tenure 143 or the vesting of a pension right, 144 had prior courts found a
binding obligation on the part of the employer. Traditionally, the
requirement of separate consideration has proven to be an insurmountable barrier to the plaintiff alleging a contract for continued
employment. 45 With its decision in Weiner, however, the New York
Court of Appeals has provided a means to use such factors in maintaining an action against the employer.
Despite the beneficial result to the employee, the Weiner decision
nevertheless fails to grant employees substantial rights to job security.

139Blades, supra note 1, at 1420; Murg & Scharman, supra note 34, at 355-57.
"1 57 N.Y.2d at 465-66, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197. The court found that
Weiner was induced to leave Prentice-Hall with the promise of job security and therein relied on
this promise by giving up a salary increase and accrued benefits. Id. Because Weiner was
employed at Prentice-Hall for only four years, the value of those "accrued benefits" is questionable. In the employment application Weiner stated that his reasons for changing jobs were
"[l]arger salary and reduced commuting time." Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 15 n.9.
On deposition he stated that he disliked the commute to Englewood Cliffs. Id.
141 Murg & Scharman, supra note 34, at 358-59.
"I See Fisher v. Jackson, 142 Conn. 734, 118 A.2d 316 (1955) (accepting new position
necessitates leaving former employment); Hanson v. Central Show Printing Co., 256 Iowa 1221,
130 N.W.2d 654 (1964) (same); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Murray, 198 Md. 526, 84
A.2d 870 (1951)(same); see also Note, supra note 1, at 354-55. The writers indicate that the
reason for not recognizing a job change is that accepting a new position necessitates the
resignation of a former job, hence the required additional consideration would be found regularly. Note, supra note 1, at 354-55. It is suggested that a promise of continued employment
could be the distinguishing characteristic. Id.
"I See Collins v. Parsons College, 203 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973) (giving up tenured teaching
position is independent consideration to support promise of permanent employment).
114 See Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App. 254, 283 N.W.2d 713 (Ct. App.
1979) (plaintiff had relinquished "soon to vest" pension).
"4sComment, supra note 1, at 1819; Committee on Labor and Employment Law, supra note
102, at 162. But see A. CORBIN, supra note 40, § 152, at 14-15 (employer's express or implied
promise to retain employee for definite period of time can be supported by services previously
rendered). Id. at § 125 (single consideration can support one or more promises).
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Unlike the Michigan court in Toussaint,'46 the Weiner court failed to
explicitly hold that a personnel manual by itself can be enforced as a
contract. Rather, the court held that the entire employment relationship must be examined to determine whether the parties intended a
just cause dismissal. 47 In Weiner, the court relied on a number of
factors in determining that the plaintiff had a cause of action for
breach of contract. The court initially focused on the fact that a
reference to the defendant's manual was made on the application
form. 148 It also was noted that the plaintiff was given oral assurances
of job security and that in reliance upon these assurances he refused
other job opportunities. 49 The plaintiff was also familiar with the
manual's provisions for dismissal and was told to follow the manual in
dealing with his subordinates.' 50 This recognition of a "totality of the
circumstances" test by the Weiner court gives employees little guidance in determining whether an enforceable agreement can be adduced. It is not clear if a provision for a just cause dismissal in an
employment manual, absent other factors, will be sufficient to support a cause of action. A better approach would have been to adopt
the reasoning of the Toussaint court, which found that a just cause
dismissal provision of a manual in and of itself was sufficient to
provide the plaintiff with a cause of action.'1 This would clarify to
the employer that the presence of such provisions could expose him to
liability.
Those arguing against the enforcement of assurances of job security maintain that work productivity will diminish because employers
will be less likely to discharge unsatisfactory workers in order to avoid
costly and disruptive litigation.' 52 Employers, however, can take a
number of protective measures to discourage spurious suits. First,
employers can assure that a discharge is in good faith and for workrelated reasons through the maintenance of employee performance
records. Second, employers can maintain meticulous documents of the
rehabilitative efforts taken by management to help the employee
improve. Third, employers can provide for internal grievance proce-

"1408 Mich.

at 579, 292 N.W.2d at 880; supra notes 81, 86, 89 and accompanying text.
57 N.Y.2d at 466-67, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
,48 Id. at 465, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
149 Id.
117

150 Id.

Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 895.
57 N.Y.2d at 468-69, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 199 (Wachtler, J. dissenting); see
Committee on Labor and Employment Law, supra note 102, at 175; Murg & Scharman, supra
note 34, at 331.
"I'
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dures to review an employee's performance before termination and
53
the reasons for termination after an employee has been discharged. 1
Litigation is at least as costly for a worker as for an employer; an
employee who has been afforded the opportunity to challenge his
release, being aware of documented evidence supporting the dismissal, will be less likely to bring suit.
Employers also receive economic benefits in providing job security. Reduced costs in job training, a higher rate of productivity
achieved through continuity in employment, and enhanced worker
satisfaction and morale are important considerations. 15 4 Further, a
just cause dismissal equalizes the imbalance of power in the employment relationship by giving the worker more control over his situation: his efforts to perform satisfactorily will result in greater job
protection. Employers can avoid contract liability entirely by omitting just cause dismissal provisions from their company handbooks
and by declining to give oral assurances of job security. 155 The recognition that such provisions and assurances are enforceable will prevent
an employer from making such statements haphazardly and thus
should reduce the incidence of situations in which prospective employees are misled.
The Weiner decision, then, represents only a small step in the
modification of the employment-at-will rule. The court recognized
the need to protect workers employed at-will, but the "totality of the
circumstances" test which it adopts does not adequately protect the
employee. The decision is not helpful in providing guidance for employers in avoiding future liability, nor does it clarify the rights of
employees. It is thus up to the New York Legislature to take the next
step by affording employees the statutory right to a just cause dismissal automatically, by eliminating the doctrine of employment-at156
will.
PatriciaMassa Bass

Murg & Scharman, supra note 34, at 383-84.
See Comment, supra note 1, at 1832-35.
l-1 Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 623, 292 N.W.2d at 896-97.
1-1 See Summers, IndividualProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Time ForA Statute, 62 VA.
L. REV. 481 (1976).
In Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d
232 (1983), the New York Court of Appeals declined to recognize the tort of abusive discharge or
contract action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith. The court stated that these issues
require the determination of public policy and the balancing of competing interests. Thus,
resolutions of these problems are more appropriately relegated to the legislature. Id. at 301-02,
448 N.E.2d at 89-90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235-36.
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